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7  Written constitutions and the administrative state: 
on the constitutional character of administrative 
law
Tom Ginsburg
Administrative law is the poor relation of public law; the hard- working, unglamorous 
cousin laboring in the shadow of constitutional law. Constitutional law, it is generally 
believed, resolves the great issues of state and society, while administrative law, in its best 
moments, merely refi nes those principles for dealing with the administrative state. Law 
students fl ock to constitutional law classes, of which most law schools have three or four 
in the curriculum. The same students enroll in administrative law with a sense of obliga-
tion, as if the subject is a chore one has to manage.
The two fi elds are, of course, intimately related, and share an overarching purpose of 
managing the relationship between state and citizen, with an emphasis on protection of 
the latter in democratic states. On the other hand, the fi elds refl ect diff erent legal sources 
and modalities. In some countries, they are adjudicated by entirely diff erent courts. 
While constitutional law is becoming ever more comparative, with judges regularly citing 
each other’s opinions, administrative law remains bound to the nation state.
This chapter makes three arguments. First, it argues that the conceptual division 
between administrative and constitutional law is quite porous, and that along many 
dimensions, administrative law can be considered more constitutional in character 
than constitutions. Second, it shows that written constitutions do relatively little to 
legally constrain the administrative state. Rather, their role is to establish the broader 
structural apparatus of governance and accountability, in which the bureaucracy is 
the great unspoken. This leaves administrative law as a relatively free- standing fi eld 
characterized by great fl exibility and endurance, features that are usually thought to 
be more embodied in constitutions. Third, the chapter concludes that the exercise of 
comparison helps to expose the limits of written constitutions, and to call for greater 
attention to comparative administrative law as a feature of the unwritten constitution 
of nation states.
1. On the constitutional character of administrative law
The conventional understanding is that the fi elds of constitutional and administrative 
law share similar purposes of protection of rights, control of agency costs, and limitation 
of government. The primary diff erence, in this view, concerns their place in the hierarchy 
of public law: constitutional law regulates the highest norms of the state, while admin-
istrative law governs sub- legislative action, somewhat lower in the hierarchy of sources, 
and hence in importance.
In contrast, I argue that along several dimensions, administrative law should be under-
stood as more ‘constitutional’ than constitutional law. Consider the widely ascribed 
functions attributed to constitutions (Breslin 2009). Many would place the function of 
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constitutionalism itself or limitation of government by law, at the fore. With regard to 
this limiting function, it is quite obvious that administrative law overlaps a good deal 
with constitutional law, and has a wider scope in the sense that it touches far more 
behavior. The average citizen is not a dissident who is concerned with the state limit-
ing her political speech; nor is the average citizen a criminal concerned with criminal 
procedure provisions in constitutions. Rather the average citizen encounters the state 
in myriad petty interactions, involving drivers’ licenses, small business permits, social 
security payments, and taxes. It is here that the rubber meets the road for constitution-
alism, where predictability and curbs on arbitrariness are least likely to be noticed but 
most likely to aff ect a large number of citizens. So it seems clear that administrative law 
is constitutionalist in orientation and arguably more important to more people than the 
grand issues of constitutional law.
Constitutionalism, though, is hardly the only function of constitutions. Indeed, con-
stitutions exist in a wide variety of states that cannot be called limited in any real sense. 
Nor are these ‘paper’ constitutions to be characterized as useless (Brown 2008). Even 
in dictatorships, constitutions can provide accurate maps of what institutions matter. 
Autocrats and oligarchies need to coordinate their own internal expectations about 
the mechanisms of rule, and constitutions can play an important role in aligning such 
expectations. In some cases, constitutional rules provide useful frameworks for resolv-
ing intra- elite disputes (Barros 2002). This function of constitutions is not limitation but 
defi nition, constituting government by empowering it and establishing organizations to 
carry out its tasks. The administrative law analogue to this function of setting up govern-
ment agencies is captured by organic statutes. These are rarely the subject of legal dispute 
except in terms of scope of delegation by the legislature.1
Another set of functions widely ascribed to constitutions are symbolic or expressive. 
In some polities, constitutions refl ect and sometimes even create a shared conscious-
ness, and so overcome regional and ethnic divisions. In South Africa, for example, the 
1996 Constitution became a symbol of participation and reconciliation, and retains 
popularity notwithstanding major social problems and disaff ection from government. 
The Mexican Constitution of 1917 is widely attributed to have had great symbolic value 
even though it took many decades before it was eff ectively enforced. The symbolic or 
expressive function of constitutions emphasizes the particularity of constitution- making. 
It is We the People that come together, and so the constitution embodies our nation in a 
distinct and local way diff erent from other polities.
So constitutions limit government, establish institutions, and serve as important 
symbols for the polity. The mode by which constitutions carry out these functions is 
familiar. Constitutions work through entrenchment, providing an enduring set of foun-
dational rules, structuring and facilitating normal politics in a particularistic way that 
refl ects local values.
Administrative law accomplishes some but not all of these functions, and does so in 
a less grand manner. Very little writing on administrative law discusses the symbolic 
dimensions of articulation of state- society relations. Organic statutes for particular 
agencies are not always entrenched, and the major instruments governing administrative 
1 For a broader perspective on coordination in administrative law, see Ahdieh (forthcoming).
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procedure and adjudication are typically statutory in character, in principle amendable 
as conditions change.
My fi rst argument is that administrative law is often a better refl ection of the local and 
that it is administrative law which provides for more endurance in many polities. Only at 
a symbolic level, then, can constitutions claim distinct functions that administrative law 
does not accomplish: only constitutions can be said to constitute the nation or bind the 
people together through common understandings. But this symbolism is in turn based on 
an illusion and a misunderstanding of the crucial constitutional characteristics of endur-
ance and localism. Constitutions serve as important symbols because people believe they 
do things that they do not. Administrative law systems, in turn, are more localized and 
more enduring, and hence worthy of greater attention in trying to understand the eff ec-
tive legal regulation of government.
1.1. Localism: constitutions converge more than do administrative law systems
The classic image of constitution- making is of a discrete group of citizens coming 
together to empower a government. This social contract imagery is temporally and 
geographically bounded. We the People produce the constitution as a distinctive refl ec-
tion of our local values. But this imagery is wrong on several scores. First, international 
actors increasingly have a stake in constitution- making and take substantive positions in 
the drafting process (Lollini and Palermo 2009). Second, and somewhat related, consti-
tutions have converged in substance over time. A substantial body of research has dem-
onstrated that provisions of national constitutions have come to refl ect a kind of script 
of national modernism in which the local is subordinate to global norms (Go 2003, Boli 
1987, Boli- Bennett and Meyer1978, 1980). The basic forms of governance, too, seem to 
divide into fairly predictable variants.
Why might this be the case? Because constitutions are the highest legal norms of a 
state, they have expressive elements, and these are often addressed outside the nation 
state at an international community. Constitutions are signals of modernity and sov-
ereignty, designed not only to empower a government but to secure recognition of that 
act on the international plane. The result is that there has been a signifi cant amount of 
constitutional convergence.
Consider menus of human rights, for example. Constitutional collections of rights 
have tended to converge over time, particularly following the passage of the major 
international human rights instruments (Elkins and Ginsburg 2009). The international 
covenants and regional charters of rights serve as menus for constitution- makers, and 
so it is hardly surprising that constitutions have become more similar to each other over 
time. There are many possible explanations for this phenomenon. Convergence may in 
part result from mimicry, in which countries need to signal their modernity and so adopt 
institutions most refl ective of the international. It might alternatively refl ect collective 
learning, as countries learn from each other and from international institutions about 
the quality of diff erent institutional confi gurations. Whatever the explanation, the result 
is that constitutions can no longer be viewed, if they ever could, as exclusively local 
aff airs.
Contrast the situation in administrative law. Surveying global developments, the 
overarching impression must be one of continued stickiness of national institutional 
confi gurations. Taking four major jurisdictions, France, Germany, the US and the 
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UK, it is clear that great institutional and ideational divergence remains. France retains 
its tradition of oversight by expert administrators in the Conseil d’Etat, with the droit 
administratif considered a separate and autonomous body of law (Brown and Bell 1998). 
Germany too retains specialized administrative courts, but unlike the French tradition 
centers its practice around an administrative procedure code that embodies the princi-
ples to be overseen by judges. In scope, too, the traditions diff er in that tort liability and 
government contract law, however, are seen to be outside the realm of German adminis-
trative law.2 While it can also include general policy directions, German administrative 
law focuses more on individual rights- type issues than on public participation in rule- 
making, which is where much of the action is in American administrative law.
In the UK, administrative law has long labored under Dicey’s suspicion of the very 
concept (Lindseth 2005, Williams 1994). Dicey saw virtue in control by the common law 
courts rather than a distinctive set of institutions, but as the modern state expanded, 
it became clear that the sheer volume of appeals would overwhelm the traditionally 
small English judiciary. The result was the creation of independent ‘tribunals’, distinct 
from the common law courts, to hear appeals from initial decisions by administrators. 
These are specifi c and specialized, tied to individual bureaucracies such as the Health 
Service, Immigration, and Social Welfare bureaucracies, although recent reforms under 
the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 promise to consolidate the structure 
(Carnworth 2009). The  tribunals have a statutory obligation to deliver independent 
justice, and they rely on notions of ‘natural justice’ in developing constraints on admin-
istrative discretion and procedure. In the United States, in contrast, the Administrative 
Procedures Act focuses a good deal of its energy on the practice of rule- making, and it is 
here that the largest battles in the administrative state are conducted.
To be sure, there has been some convergence across jurisdictions in the norms of 
administrative law. Most major systems involve questions of balancing, proportionality 
and procedural transparency. One can generalize that in all four jurisdictions one can 
describe administrative law as largely judge- made (counting the Conseil d’Etat as a judi-
cial organ), in which courts apply a set of open- ended standards to myriad factual situ-
ations. But each system remains its own distinctive animal. Furthermore, there is little 
of the trans- national judicial borrowing that has drawn such attention in comparative 
constitutional interpretation.
One of the reasons that administrative law may have converged less than constitu-
tional law is the lack of agreement over the scope of the fi eld. Constitutions, for nearly 
all modern states today, are defi ned in relation to (even if not exclusively bounded 
by) authoritative texts called constitutions. There is less conceptual agreement on the 
boundaries of administrative law: while all the administrative law schemes rely heavily 
on a notion of internal and external boundaries of the system, the precise lines diff er (for 
example, with regard to where government contracts fall), as does the precise mix of tort 
liability, judicial remedies and other mechanisms of control. Administrative procedure 
calibrates the rigidity of the boundaries and refl ects diff erent conceptions of public and 
private. For example, continental and Japanese systems draw on a strong conceptual 
2 The scope of government liability is in fact less extensive in Germany than in France. 
In Germany, it is covered by principles of negligence, whereas in France, no- fault liability for 
 regulations is allowed (Singh 2001:257).
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distinction between public and private law. In the United States, the public- private dis-
tinction is less rigid, with private law regularly utilized to accomplish regulatory ends, 
and hence the proper boundaries of administrative law as a fi eld may be somewhat 
more open. The relative mix of natural law principles and positivistic focus on proper 
 delegations also varies across systems.
Institutional structures diff er, too, with distinctive administrative courts in France and 
Germany, while the Anglo- American systems rely on the generalized notion of the rule 
of law to subject the state to ordinary courts, on an equal footing as citizens. The systems 
also exhibit divergence on the extent to which administrative law has been developed 
primarily through case- by- case judicial decision- making or through legislative exercises 
in codifi cation; though again it must be said that judicial development has played a 
prominent role nearly everywhere.
In short, there may be less convergence in administrative law than in constitutional 
law, where judges regularly look to decisions of other courts, and constitutional drafters 
draw on foreign models. Forces against convergence in administrative law include insti-
tutional inertia, entrenched political interests, path dependencies, and cultural prefer-
ences that render some solutions unattractive in particular polities. Many scholars have 
argued that public law should see less convergence than corporate or private law because 
it refl ects values rather than interests, and hence is less likely to be shaped by short- term 
economic factors. Professor Schwarze (2004, see also Lindseth 2005), for example, cata-
logues the traditional arguments that administrative law expresses ‘national particulari-
ties’ and therefore is relatively impermeable to change.
Administrative law concerns the control of regulatory institutions, and regulatory 
institutions are diffi  cult to establish. Once established, they are even harder to get rid 
of. An alternative to eliminating agencies is to seek to exercise greater control over 
them, and administrative law becomes a natural solution. It is perhaps no surprise 
that all industrialized countries have developed extensive bodies of administrative 
law in the past century. But administrative procedures, like primary regulatory rules, 
also have the quality of establishing their own communities around them. The much- 
criticized Administrative Procedures Act in the United States has never been changed 
despite numerous proposals to that eff ect. Nor is it likely that specialized administra-
tive courts can be disbanded without a major constitutional revolution. While we have 
seen the establishment of new administrative courts and specialized benches (that is, 
in Korea, with similar proposals currently circulating in Japan), it is rare to see an 
administrative court merged into the ordinary court system. Indeed, in the French 
case, the Conseil Constitutionnel has even held that one has the right to recourse to 
an administrative judge. In short, then, inertia can make switching costs of change 
prohibitive and the disbanding of institutions diffi  cult. Thus we see substantial diver-
gence in the structures of administrative law. A corollary of this continued divergence 
is that administrative law systems refl ect localism more than constitutional law, which 
is now embedded in open and vigorous transnational dialogues about particular issues 
(Jackson 2009).
1.2. Endurance: administrative law institutions endure, while constitutions do not
Constitutions are defi ned by entrenchment, and their authors and audiences presuppose 
that they provide a set of relatively enduring norms. To be sure, constitutions are subject 
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to amendment procedures, but these are assumed to be exercised relatively infrequently 
and only for issues of suffi  cient importance. Constitutions are higher law and hence to be 
protected against frequent change. Indeed, the very notion of constitutionalism presup-
poses a certain level of endurance.
Yet written constitutions do not endure in most countries (Elkins et al. 2009). Even 
among industrial democracies, France (with its 11 constitutions since 1791) is more 
typical than the United States, with its venerable 220- year old document. In Western 
Europe, the region of the world where constitutions are most enduring, the average 
document will last only about 30 years, and the fi gure for countries in other parts of the 
world is much lower. Constitutional change is sometimes associated with drastic changes 
in the character of the regime, in the design of political institutions, and the mechanisms 
of ensuring political accountability.
Contrast administrative law institutions. The venerable Conseil d’Etat has survived 
episodic swings between monarchy and republic, presidentialism and parliamentarism, 
dictatorship and democracy. It has maintained a relatively autonomous system of moni-
toring bureaucratic behavior and ensuring legality in administration. (Indeed, one might 
argue that the formal constitution matters less in the French tradition precisely because 
the autonomous state endures.) Nor is France alone. The Swedish ombudsman institu-
tion dates to 1809 and has survived major transformations of the political structure. And 
distinct administrative courts in the German tradition have been enduring.3 The Soviet 
procuracy survived myriad constitutional changes, and indeed has retained its role of 
general supervision in some post- soviet constitutions notwithstanding complete regime 
transformation. When one moves beyond Western Europe, constitutions become more 
ephemeral but administrative law structures may be relatively stable. Thailand, with its 
18 constitutions since 1932, may be an extreme case, but bureaucratic autonomy cen-
tered around a Council of State has been an enduring feature.4 Similarly, the institution 
of amparo in Latin America has enjoyed widespread and continuous usage, notwith-
standing constitutional instability (Brewer- Carias 2008).
Institutional structures are distinct from legal norms. The norms of administrative law 
do change with developments in technology, with ideas about rights, and with the emer-
gence of communities of accountability, all of which may refl ect changes embodied in 
constitutional texts. Nevertheless, this discussion suggests that administrative law struc-
tures are relatively enduring, in many cases more so than constitutional regimes. Indeed, 
endurance at the administrative level may ameliorate the negative eff ects of instability 
at the constitutional level: whatever the machinations over political institutions, citizens 
may enjoy relative predictability in relations with the state bureaucracy.
3 Japan did change its structure of administrative law with the 1946 Constitution, shifting 
away from the German tradition of distinct administrative courts toward the American model of 
unifi ed jurisdiction. Some attribute Japanese judges’ reluctance to challenge administrative action 
to the institutional residue associated with this shift – ordinary judges do not have confi dence in 
their ability to second guess administration (Haley 1991).
4 The 1997 Constitution corresponded with the introduction of an administrative court that 
did have important ramifi cations for Thai administrative law. But this was the exception that 
proved the rule (Leyland 2008).
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1.3. Symbolism: the inferiority of administrative law systems
To summarize the argument so far, administrative law is enduring and it retains a local 
quality even in an era of globalization. Constitutional law, in contrast, is increasingly 
transnational as well as, too frequently, transitional. One might then view administrative 
law regimes as better embodying constitutional values than constitutions themselves.
One distinct feature of national constitutions, however, is their ability to bind the polity 
together through symbolic expression. Not all constitutions eff ectively play this role, but 
it is an aspiration of many. In contrast, administrative law is rarely ascribed symbolic 
resonance. Few are willing to die for the principle that expert regulators ought to hold a 
public hearing before deciding how many parts per million of a pollutant can be released 
by a smokestack, or that an individual has a right to pre- deprivation hearing regarding 
loss of social security eligibility. Here, then, we expose what is truly distinctive about 
constitutional law, and the one sense in which constitutions can be said to be more con-
stitutional than administrative law regimes. Constitutions express ideas about the polity, 
and do so largely on an international stage. We the People are signifying that we are not 
those other people, and so adopt statements of our distinct national character embodied 
in constitutional institutions. And because the statements are directed, to some degree, 
outside the state, they require a common language to be understood. Convergence in 
constitutional vocabulary in some sense facilitates the distinct  communicative quality of 
written constitutions.
Perhaps it is too much to say that administrative law systems lack symbolic value. 
Some scholars have talked about the communicative and legitimating virtues of admin-
istrative process. But one would be hard- pressed to argue that the degree of symbolic 
importance attached to administrative law systems approaches that of constitutions. 
Written constitutions embody moments of great struggle and high stakes, and hence 
mark the great junctures of national history.
2. Written constitutions and the administrative state
This part of the chapter examines the constitutional treatment of administrative law. In 
general, written constitutions tend to say relatively little about the administrative state, 
though the establishment of a government structure is a core function of constitutions. 
While the rules governing selection and activities of executives and parliaments are 
described in great detail, the sub- political institutions of government are not consist-
ently or thoroughly regulated. Written constitutions tend to focus on providing chains 
of accountability and democratic legitimacy for the decisions of administrators, rather 
than detailed rules regulating the administration. In other words, constitutions tend to 
regulate administration structurally rather than legally.
A search of several hundred contemporary and constitutional texts reveals that only 
a handful mention the bureaucracy at all, and often use bureaucracy as an epithet.5 In 
terms of legal constraint on the state, general due process- type considerations may apply 
particularly to administrative agencies.6 But provisions such as South Africa’s Article 
5 For example, the Constitution of Vietnam (1992), Art. 112 (power of government to ‘fi ght 
against bureaucracy’ in state administration). The sample is from the Comparative Constitutions 
Project, www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org.
6 For example, the Constitution of Dominican Republic (1966), Art. 8.2.j (no sentence without 
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33, constitutionalizing rights to ‘lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair’ administrative 
action and a right to receive reasons for adverse actions, are truly exceptional.7 General 
due process requirements, which are found more broadly (roughly 10% of national con-
stitutions) are on their face frequently restricted to criminal proceedings, and hence may 
not automatically facilitate judicial oversight of administration.
What one does see is that written constitutions refl ect developments in the technol-
ogy of governance. Thus, the creation of the independent regulatory agency is refl ected 
in constitutional texts: the US Constitution of 1789 of course does not mention any 
independent agencies (it barely mentions ‘departments’), while the average constitution 
drafted in the 1990s mentions more than three such bodies. And certain administrative 
law institutions, like the ombudsman or human rights commissions, have become more 
popular: roughly 20% of constitutions currently in force provide for an ombudsman, for 
example. A smaller number, less than 10%, provide for a counter corruption commis-
sion. Historically, the regulatory body most relevant to checking the administrative state 
is a council or court of audit, and these institutions are relatively frequently observed: 
nearly 20% of all constitutional texts coded to date in our project (700 total) include 
some agency designed to supervise accounts or audit.8
Another way in which constitutions may aff ect the administrative state is through the 
establishment of a public service commission or other device to guarantee meritocratic 
employment practices. In many societies, state jobs are highly desirable and so the temp-
tation to utilize them as a form of patronage is great. A pre- commitment to meritocracy 
is a constitutional function. As early as 1824, Brazil’s Constitution felt the need to say 
that ‘all individuals are equal to occupy public offi  ces; talent and virtues will determine 
if a person can occupy a public offi  ce’.9 The Republic of China went so far as to establish 
an entire branch of government, the Examination Yuan, just to administer state exams. 
This body still functions on Taiwan today, and as a formal matter has equal status with 
the Legislative and Executive branches of government. Its head is equivalent to the 
Premier. The Republic of China also established a ‘Control’ branch of government, set 
up to audit and fi ght corruption. Though these innovations have not been borrowed 
elsewhere, their motivation is widespread.
Finally, constitutions engage with administrative law through the designation of 
administrative court systems. These are found in countries from Mexico to Mongolia, 
though they are not always constitutionalized (only about 2% of cases in our sample 
include them). Even the French Constitution makes only incremental reference to the 
Conseil d’Etat, which is not properly speaking a creature of the political constitution.
But the designation of an administrative jurisdiction can have very important conse-
quences on the ground. In some transitioning democracies, it is the administrative courts 
rather than the higher profi le constitutional court that have actually served to constrain 
the state. Two examples here are Indonesia (Bedner 2001) and Thailand (Leyland 2008). 
procedure established by law); Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 38 (no person shall be tried on 
any criminal charge save in due course of law).
7 See also Draft Constitution of Kenya (1999), Art 70.
8 For details, see www.constitutionmaking.org and www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org 
or contact author.
9 Art. 179.14.
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In each case, a constitutional court created as part of a transition to democracy was set 
up alongside a new or recently created administrative court. In each case, the constitu-
tional court was called on to adjudicate high- profi le political issues that led to a politi-
cal backlash against the court. In contrast, the administrative law systems worked at a 
lower level of government and served to provide, for the fi rst time in many areas, genuine 
legality in administration. This is an example of how a lower- profi le administrative 
court may have more impact in furthering constitutionalist values than a higher- profi le 
 constitutional court.
In short, written constitutions are short on detail about legal control of administra-
tion. Administrative action is regulated through structural provisions on the design of 
government and accountability chains, through the creation of specialized monitors 
such as ombudsmen and administrative courts, and through provisions requiring merit- 
based selection of agents. To understand the functioning of administrative law in various 
countries, written constitutions turn out not to be very helpful, notwithstanding the 
 constitutional character of many of the norms and purposes of administrative law.
3.  Administrative law systems as an element of the uncodifi ed constitution
In recent years, scholars have renewed their attention to the so- called unwritten con-
stitution (Grey 1978, Ackerman 2007, Young 2008, Tribe 2008). It has, of course, long 
been recognized that, in any constitutional system, the language of constitutional text 
is modifi ed and interpreted by political actors and courts. In the United States, judges 
of the Supreme Court have fi lled in the details of the vague 18th century document to 
make it suitable for modern life, notwithstanding the lack of explicit textual basis for 
constitutional review. More broadly, extraconstitutional mechanisms of constitutional 
change have in some sense involved or relied on unwritten constitutional conventions 
(Ackerman 1993, Munro 1928, Tiedeman 1890).
Constitutional functions are also performed by written texts beyond the constitu-
tion itself. Some statutes have been considered to be ‘super- statutes’ that are practically 
entrenched, even if not formally so (Eskridge and Ferejohn 2005). Although the writers 
on super- statutes focus on particular regulatory instruments, such as the Sherman 
Antitrust Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, procedural laws surely fi t into the cat-
egory in the sense of meeting criteria of de facto entrenchment and substantive reach. 
Administrative procedures laws are meta- regulations, designed to govern the way in 
which substantive regulations are generated and operate. It seems diffi  cult to exclude 
the US Administrative Procedures Act, for example, from the scope of the ‘constitution 
outside the constitution’. Perhaps, then, the analysis here suggests the need to keep our 
eyes wide in looking for legal instruments that embody constitutionalism.
The core critique of the uncodifi ed constitution is, unsurprisingly, rooted in the lack of 
a rule of recognition. Without a clear rule that helps to identify particular norms as con-
stitutional or not- constitutional, the boundaries of the category become fuzzy. But the 
discussion at the outset of this chapter seems potentially helpful for articulating consti-
tutional boundary criteria. Constitutions, we have seen, focus on regulating interactions 
between the state and the people, and are at least imagined to be relatively enduring. In 
considering what norms outside the constitution might be considered uncodifi ed consti-
tutional norms, it seems clear that those rules that are relatively enduring, and purport 
to regulate the relationship between the state and society, should be within the defi nition.
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What are the normative consequences of treating administrative law systems as essen-
tially constitutional in character? First, such constitutional realism helps us to focus 
on those areas where constitutionalist values are most frequently encountered, even if 
not always the matters of the highest stakes. Routine matters like drivers’ licenses and 
building permits make a diff erence to more people than the high principles of constitu-
tional text, even if they do not always carry great symbolic weight. Second, this focus 
on the micro- level interactions of citizen and state draws needed attention away from 
the constitutional courts, heretofore considered central actors in upholding the rule of 
law. Constitutional courts, by the very nature of their exclusive and high jurisdiction, 
frequently become embroiled in high profi le politics that can undermine rather than 
enhance their ability to constrain the state. Administrative courts may in such circum-
stances be more important on a number of levels. Finally, such an approach helps to 
highlight the importance of the discipline of comparative administrative law. While the 
fi eld is still nascent, the various contributions in this volume help to draw out the rich 
array of possibilities for the discipline.
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